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ABSTRACT
Estimating influence on social media networks is an important prac-
tical and theoretical problem, especially because this new medium is
widely exploited as a platform for disinformation and propaganda.
This paper introduces a novel approach to influence estimation on
social media networks and applies it to the real-world problem of
characterizing active influence operations on Twitter during the
2017 French presidential elections. The new influence estimation
approach attributes impact by accounting for narrative propagation
over the network using a network causal inference framework ap-
plied to data arising from graph sampling and filtering. This causal
framework infers the difference in outcome as a function of ex-
posure, in contrast to existing approaches that attribute impact to
activity volume or topological features, which do not explicitly mea-
sure nor necessarily indicate actual network influence. Cramér-Rao
estimation bounds are derived for parameter estimation as a step in
the causal analysis, and used to achieve geometrical insight on the
causal inference problem. The ability to infer high causal influence
is demonstrated on real-world social media accounts that are later
independently confirmed to be either directly affiliated or correlated
with foreign influence operations using evidence supplied by the
U.S. Congress and journalistic reports.
Index Terms— Estimation on graphs, influence estimation,
causal inference, social networks, graph analytics, network detec-
tion, Cramér-Rao bounds on graph estimation
1. INTRODUCTION
Social media is now used by a majority of individuals across the in-
dustrialized world, and in 2018 is estimated to overtake traditional
media in the U.S. [28]. This large-scale growth of worldwide so-
cial media networks is built upon their essential features of universal
access, immediacy, and power to communicate with and influence
others. These key design features have also created a potent new
medium and an enabling technology for disinformation and propa-
ganda [6, 7, 24, 29, 31, 39]. Detecting and estimating influence on
social media networks is the problem of inferring the impact of an
input at one node on the rest of the network. This is an impor-
tant theoretical and practical problem that arises in marketing on
social media [6,17], influence maximization [5,12], information dif-
fusion [13, 16, 19, 39], and the spread of both information and disin-
formation in social networks [3, 6, 7, 10, 20, 24, 29, 31, 38].
This paper introduces a novel approach to influence estimation
on social media networks and applies it to the real-world problem of
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pressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
characterizing online influence operations [2,4,22]. The new frame-
work contains the generality to account for influence on populations
with and without observed outcomes, which addresses the issue of
biased sampling. Both groups contain individuals that are receptive
to influence, or not receptive, the latter defined as having outcomes
invariant to the influence exposure. The approach also subsumes
the important case of a network engaged in a specific narrative. The
estimation problem is posed using Bayesian inference with these dis-
tinctive aspects of social media networks:
• (Sampled) graph data of social network interactions
• Heterogeneous natural language and multi-media data
• Causal relationship among interactions
1.1. Contributions
The new influence estimation approach proposed here aims to at-
tribute impact by accounting for causal narrative propagation over
the network, while addressing the challenge of discriminating be-
tween actual social influence and mere homophily [29, 32]. Statis-
tical inferential methods are used to estimate model parameters for
causal influence on social networks. This causal framework infers
the difference in outcome as a function of exposure, in contrast to
existing approaches that attribute impact to activity volume or topo-
logical features, which do not explicitly measure nor necessarily in-
dicate actual network influence. Cramér-Rao estimation bounds are
derived for this parameter estimation problem and used for geomet-
rical insight on the causal inference problem. Natural language pro-
cessing tools are used to filter the network data into specific narrative
contexts for influence estimation, and to classify the sampled graph
data into case/non-case data.
This approach is applied to publicly available Twitter data col-
lected over the 2017 French presidential elections, during which
there was an active influence operation campaign targeting these
elections [2, 4, 22]. The ability to infer high causal influence is
demonstrated on real-world social media accounts that were later
independently confirmed to be either directly affiliated or corre-
lated with foreign influence operations by evidence supplied by the
U.S. Congress [35] and journalistic reports [18]. Furthermore, the
new approach is shown to reveal influential accounts that are not
obvious based upon simple activity statistics. These results support
the utility of the proposed framework.
Section 2 describes the network sampling procedure. Section 3
describes the narrative context filtering approach. The novel ap-
proach to causal influence estimation is given in Section 4. Real-
world data examples will be used to illustrate the overall approach
throughout the paper.
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Fig. 1: Hashtag frequencies during the 2017 French elections. The
#MacronLeaks narrative, referring to thousands of leaked documents,
dominated election-related social media discussions hours before the
mandatory French media blackout [2, 18].
2. GRAPH SAMPLING USING TARGETED CONTEXT
The vast majority of social media interactions are irrelevant to a
intended context of interest for influence estimation. Therefore, an
appropriate graph sampling mechanism is needed. Ideally, the sam-
pling mechanism must efficiently capture relevant examples of both
the influence network and associated content, under rate-limited
server queries. In this paper we use a content-based approach for
network graph sampling based on a method for optimum network
detection [26, 27].
First, potentially relevant social media content (e.g. hashtags or
keywords) and user account handles are identified using prior knowl-
edge and subject matter expertise about the targeted context, similar
to Berger’s approach [1]. Second, publicly available information as-
sociated with these prior cues are collected. Relevance is determined
by a set of hashtags, keywords, and user account handles whose con-
tent is aligned with hypothesized influence campaigns. Third, graph
sampling is performed by selectively collecting content prioritized
by a threat propagation model on the graph [26, 27].
More than 20 million tweets and 2 million user account han-
dles of potential relevance to foreign influence operations in the 2017
French presidential elections were collected using the Twitter pub-
lic application programming interface (API) [34] during April and
May 2017. This data set includes accounts that are positively iden-
tified as part of the foreign influence campaign [35]; however, no
affiliation is implied or ascribed to any specific account without in-
dependent corroboration. Fig. 1 shows a plot of the top Twitter hash-
tag narrative frequencies collected during this period. The promi-
nent #MacronLeaks narrative, referring to thousands of leaked doc-
uments, dominated election-related social media discussions hours
before the mandatory French media blackout for the second round
on 7 May [2, 18]. In Section 4, the network associated with this
narrative will be used to demonstrate estimation of the most influen-
tial accounts. Fig. 2 illustrates this narrative graph (5,370 accounts,
124,259 interactions) and highlights potentially influential accounts
based upon activity levels and subsequent journalistic reports [18].
Some of these accounts will be shown to possess high levels of causal
influence, whereas others are estimated to have much less influence,
underscoring the insight that high activity is not necessarily corre-
lated with high influence.
3. GRAPH FILTERING USING NARRATIVES
Social influence occurs within a specific context. The sampled data
must be filtered by a characterization of the narrative prior to influ-
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Fig. 2: Social network of the #MacronLeaks narrative, 5–7 May, high-
lighting potentially influential accounts based on journalistic reports
and high activity [18].
ence estimation. This may be as simple as searching for a single
keyword, utilizing natural language processing to focus on a spe-
cific narrative, or community detection approaches to filter the graph,
or some combination of these. E.g. Stewart et al. use an Infomap
clustering algorithm to perform community detection on a retweet
graph [29]. One narrative derived from the content of the #Macron-
Leaks tweets [2] is illustrated by the wordcloud in Fig. 3. For ex-
ample, an account @Pamela_Moore13 known to be tied to foreign in-
fluence operations [35] is observed to promote this and many other
hashtag-based divisive narratives aligned with these operations.
#MacronLeaks
Dems: Trump shouldn't support #LePen. It's interfering w/ the French election
Obama: "I support #Macron"…
Pamela Moore @Pamela_Moore13 · 9:48 PM - 5 May 2017 
1,892 2,196
5 mysterious deaths connected to the DNC…
There must be an investigation! RT IF YOU AGREE!
#SethRich
Pamela Moore @Pamela_Moore13 · 1:09 AM - 30 May 2017 
3,382 2,569
The #MacronLeaks narrative example is prominent and well-defined;
therefore, a simple keyword search is an adequate filter. In general,
combining content-based narrative detection with community detec-
tion is expected to be necessary to estimate influence in broader con-
texts than provided by a single hashtag.
4. GRAPH INFLUENCE ESTIMATION
The proposed causal framework for influence estimation introduced
in this section infers the difference in outcome as a function of expo-
sure, in contrast to approaches that attribute impact to activity vol-
ume or topological features. Existing approaches are based on net-
work topology [13,16,24], node degree or activity [20,38], informa-
tion diffusion [12, 17, 19], and cascade lengths [3, 5, 7, 16, 17]. None
of these metrics explicitly measure nor necessarily indicate actual
network influence. For example, an account that tweets little can be
highly influential, and vice-versa. Examples of this claim are demon-
strated with real data below. The proposed causal inference approach
Fig. 3: Tag cloud topic narrative of the #MacronLeaks hashtag.
aims to quantify influence by accounting for causal narrative prop-
agation over the entire network, including the timing of the tweets
and the position of the influencer in the network. It also accounts for
several potential confounders (e.g. community membership, popu-
larity) and removes their effects from the causal estimation. The
impact of an individual account on the narrative network [Fig. 2] is
defined as the average (per vertex) number of additional tweets gen-
erated by its participation [Fig. 4]. This impact is estimated using
a recent network causal inference framework [11], itself based upon
Rubin’s causal framework [9]. This approach is related to other work
in causal inference on networks [30, 33, 36]; it is unique in its infer-
ence methodology that uses the network potential outcomes.
4.1. Causal Influence Estimation on Networks
Let G = (V,E) be a graph with N vertices V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vN},
whose edges are denoted by the observed interactions between vi
and v j, let A = (ai j) be an N-by-N matrix of social influence of vi
on v j with Poisson rate determined by the graph data G, and Z
be a binary N-vector of narrative sources (a.k.a. treatment vector).
The fundamental quantity is the network potential outcome of each
individual vertex, denoted Yi(Z,A), under exposure to the narrative
through the source vector Z and influence network A. In the analy-
sis below, vertices are user accounts in the narrative network, edges
are retweets relevant to the narrative, and the potential outcomes are
the number of tweets in the narrative. The impact ζi of each vertex
on the narrative is defined using the network potential outcomes,
ζi(z)
def
=
1
N
N
∑
j=1
(
Y j(Z = zi+,A)−Y j(Z = zi−,A)
)
. (1)
This causal estimand is the average difference between the individ-
ual potential outcomes with vi as a source s.t. zi+ = (z1, . . . ,zi := 1,
. . . ,zN)T, versus vi not a source s.t. zi− = (z1, . . . ,zi := 0, . . . ,zN)T.
This impact is the average (per vertex) number of additional tweets
generated by a vertex vi’s participation. The source is uniquely im-
pactful if it is the only source.
It is impossible to observe the potential outcomes at each ver-
tex with both exposure conditions under source vectors zi+ and zi−;
therefore, the missing potential outcomes must be estimated. This
can be accomplished by modeling the potential outcomes. After es-
timating the model parameters from the observed outcomes and ver-
tex covariates, missing potential outcomes in the causal estimand ζi
can be imputed using the fitted model.
In this analysis, potential outcomes are modeled using a condi-
tional Poisson generalized linear model (GLM) with the canonical
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Fig. 4: Influence estimation on the #MacronLeaks narrative network
of Fig. 2. Vertices are accounts and edges are retweets. Vertex color
indicates the number of tweets and the vertex size corresponds to
out-degrees. Impact is the average number of additional tweets gen-
erated by an user’s participation [Eq. (1)].
log link function and linear predictor coefficients (τ,γ,β,µ) corre-
sponding to the source indicator Zi, n-hop exposure vector s
(n)
i (Z),
the covariate vector xi, and the baseline outcome. The first two
parameters τ and γ account for influence from the source(s), and
the second two parameters β and µ account for individual baseline
propensity. The covariate vector xi has m elements corresponding
to the number of observed or inferred covariates on each vertex, in-
cluding the potential social confounders such as popularity and com-
munity membership. The conditional GLM model for the potential
outcomes is,
logλi = τZi+
(Nhop
∑
n=1
n
∏
k=1
τγks
(n)
i (Z)
)
+βTxi+µ+ εi, (2)
with Yi(Z,A) ∼ Poisson(λi). The first term in the linear predictor
τZi represents the primary effect of the source. The second term
represents the accumulative social influence effect from n-hop ex-
posures s(n)i (Z) to the source, where each coefficient γk captures
the decay of the effect over each additional hop. The third term in
Eq. (2) is the effect of the vertex covariates xi including the po-
tential social confounders such as popularity and community mem-
bership. In the analysis below, two confounders are used: popu-
larity, based on vertex degree, and community membership, based
on language. The fourth term, µ , is the baseline effect on the en-
tire population. The last term εi ∼ Normal(0,σ2ε ) gives indepen-
dent and identically distributed variation for heterogeneity between
the units. The amounts of social exposure at the nth hop are deter-
mined by (AT)nZ. This captures all exposure to the sources propa-
gated on the influence network. Lastly, to model the diminishing re-
turn of additional exposures, the (nonnegative) log-exposure is used,
s(n)(Z) = log
(
(AT)nZ+1
)
.
Joint Bayesian inference of the model parameters τ , γ, β, µ ,
and the social influence matrix A is done through Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) with Bayesian regression updates [8], in
which the observations Y (Z = zi+,A) are used to compute sam-
ples of the posterior density P(τ,γ,β,µ | Y ). The samples are used
to impute potential outcomes via Eq. (2). Gibbs sampling is used
Table 1: #MacronLeaks narrative network screen names, tweets (T),
total retweets (TRT), most retweeted tweet (MRT), followers (F) [in
thousands], initial times (on 5 May), PageRank centrality (PR) [14,
21], and estimated influence of example accounts.
Screen name T TRT MRT F 1st time PR Impact*
@JackPosobiec 95 47k 5k 261k 18:49 2.84 5.60
@RedPillDropper 32 8k 3k 8k 19:33 2.86 1.80
@UserA† 256 59k 8k 1k 19:34 27.08 0.05
@UserB† 260 54k 8k 3k 20:25 57.05 4.84
@wikileaks 25 63k 7k 5515k 20:32 2.80 4.18
@Pamela_Moore13 4 4k 2k 54k 21:14 2.79 4.16
@UserC† 1305 51k 8k < 1k 22:16 6.36 0.80
*Influence estimate from Eq. (1) applied to data
†Anonymized screen names of currently active accounts
to sequentially update individual model parameter estimates, con-
ditioned on estimates of the others. Weakly informative, truncated
priors are chosen to reduce the prior assumption’s effect on the pos-
terior density, and to improve MCMC robustness and convergence.
4.2. Influence Estimation Accuracy
The lower bound on the sampling variance of the influence estimate
is an important quantity to compute because it indicates both the best
precision achievable, and provides geometric insight into the depen-
dency of the influence estimate on both the data and parameters [25].
The Cramér-Rao lower bound on the model parameter sampling co-
variance is computed from the inverse of the Fisher information ma-
trix of the proposed Poisson GLM,
F =−Ey
[
∂ 2`(τ,γ,β,µ)/∂ (τ,γ,β,µ)2
]
, (3)
where y are the observed potential outcomes and ` is the log-
likelihood function. For the simplest form of the proposed Poisson-
GLM model with 1-hop exposure, a scalar vertex covariate, and
conditional independence between vertices, the Fisher information
matrix is,
F =
N
∑
i=1
λi

φ2i φiτs
(1)
i φixi φi
(τs(1)i )
2 τs(1)i xi τs
(1)
i
x2i xi
1
 , (4)
where φi
def
= Zi+ γ1s
(1)
i .
The precision of the impact estimates on ζ depends primarily on
the variances of the primary effect coefficient τ and the social effect
coefficient γ1, because they drive the total effect of exposures to the
sources. The first and second diagonal terms (F11 and F22) of the
information matrix quantify the information content on τ and γ1, so
maximizing these two terms leads to smaller sampling variances and
therefore more precise impact estimates. By inspection, these two
terms are maximized when vertices with large expected outcomes
(λ ) receive a large amount of peer exposures (s(1)). This happens
when sources are on vertices with high out-degrees and clustered
around vertices with large expected outcomes. For parsimony, this
analysis is on the simplest proposed model, but can be easily general-
ized to multi-hops and multi-vertex-covariate situations, with similar
resulting intuition.
The results of the causal impact estimation approach on the
#MacronLeaks narrative network is shown in Fig. 4 and Table 1,
where the impact of example participatory accounts are highlighted.
Vertex color indicates the number of times each account tweets
#MacronLeaks; vertex size is the out-degree (i.e. the number of
retweets on each account). Among the accounts with high estimated
impact, there exists independent confirmation on the prominence of
the accounts @wikileaks and @JackPosobiec in pushing the #Macron-
Leaks narrative [18]. A new finding is the high impact in the social
media network discussing the 2017 French presidential elections
of an account known to be tied to foreign influence operations:
@Pamela_Moore13 [35].
These results highlight the ability of causal influence estima-
tion to infer high impact beyond statistics based upon activity- and
topologically-based statistics, e.g. PageRank centrality [14, 21].
Compare @UserA to @UserB, whose statistics are very similar, yet
@UserB is estimated to have much greater impact because it serves
as a bridge into the predominantly French-speaking subgraph (the
cluster seen in the middle of Fig. 4). The highly active accounts
@UserA and @UserC tweeted about #MacronLeaks many times, but
were not estimated to have high impact. In contrast, some accounts
with only a few #MacronLeaks tweets and lower centrality are esti-
mated to have very high causal impact. As observed in Fig. 4, higher
out-degree is correlated with impact, but provides only partial infor-
mation for influence estimation. E.g. @Pamela_Moore13 has much
lower out-degree count than @wikileaks, @JackPosobiec, or @UserB,
but nevertheless has high impact from her strong influence on the
vertices near her in the retweet network.
Additional analysis is necessary to address important issues and
potential limitations of these specific results and the current ap-
proach. Specifically, this analysis uses a uniquely impactful source
per causal influence estimate; generalizing the source vector would
include the effect of exposure to multiples sources on outcomes.
The analysis also relies upon a specific potential outcome model.
Rigorous model checking and tuning must be performed. Because
one cannot depend on knowing the true potential outcome model in
real-world studies, the biasing effects of confounding covariates may
not be removed entirely through modeling. Additional mitigation
should be done through selecting and weighing observed outcomes
to balance the confounding covariates across different exposure
groups to address biased sampling effects [23]. Lastly, this analysis
focuses on the population engaged in the narrative. The effect of
this selection bias can be addressed by including the population that
is not engaged, but receptive to influence. Fortuitously, the narrative
filtering step of Section 3 can provide data on this type of population.
5. CONCLUSIONS
A novel approach to influence estimation on social media networks
is introduced and applied to the problem of characterizing online in-
fluence operations. The approach uses a network causal inference
framework applied to social media network data arising from graph
sampling and filtering. The causal framework directly infers influ-
ence as a function of exposure. The Cramér-Rao lower bound on the
model parameter covariance is computed, providing insight about
the effect of the social media network on estimation precision. Twit-
ter data collected during the 2017 French presidential elections are
used to demonstrate influence estimation performance. A new find-
ing is the high impact of an account known to be tied to foreign influ-
ence operations in social media discussions of the French elections.
Independent confirmation of the ability to infer high causal influ-
ence is provided from subsequent evidence from the U.S. Congress
and journalistic reports.
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